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By building upon a number of accident reports and on cognitive psychology literature, this paper addresses the 
effect of stress on the reasoning abilities and on the perceptual processes of pilots. We examine several cases, 
including American Airlines 587 (New York, 2001), United Airlines 173 (Portland, 1978), KLM 4508 (Tenerife, 
1977), Northwest Airlines 6231(Thiells NY, 1974), and Eastern Airlines 401 (Everglades, 1972), in which pilots 
have, or may have, contributed to an accident by incorrectly interpreting the unfolding scenario, and specifically by 
disregarding alternative interpretations of the unfolding scenario. While current research efforts have yet to provide 
guidance on how to successfully handle the problems discussed in this paper, examination of prior accidents may 
shed some light on the issue.   
 
Introduction 
 
Operator performance under stress is a topic that has 
been under scrutiny for decades.  In an environment 
in which operational settings contain a range of 
stressors, it is important to understand the effects of 
these stressors on operator performance in order to 
compensate for the possible decrements that result.  
One specific operational setting which has been 
prominent in this field is the aircraft cockpit.  Aircraft 
pilots are faced with an array of stressors, ranging 
from environmental stressors to which they are 
routinely exposed and trained to endure, to those 
associated with emergency situations.  Although 
there has been extensive research in the field, 
creating situations in which equivalent stress is 
produced has proven quite difficult if not impossible.  
The levels of stress induced, though probably lower 
than those with which a pilot would be faced during 
an emergency, have proven successful in detecting 
effects on pilot/operator performance.  Some 
conflicting data have resulted; however, enough 
studies have come to the same conclusion that stress 
can have negative effects on operator/pilot 
performance in several different modes (Wickens, et 
al., 1993), (Driskell, et al., 1999), (Barnett & 
Wickens, 1986 as cited by Wickens et al., 1993).  
Research has indicated that the arousal of stress may 
severely disrupt a pilot’s ability to objectively 
evaluate the situation with which he is faced.  
Specifically, cognitive tunneling can occur.  
Cognitive tunneling is a phenomenon in which a pilot 
will not adequately perceive all pertinent information 
because of filtering based on preexisting 
expectations, initial impressions or other undefined 
factors.  This increases the likelihood that sensorial 
stimuli and alternative scenario interpretations would 
only be considered if consistent with these pre-
existing expectations.  While there is limited 
experimental data on the effects of stress equivalent 
to that experienced during a flight emergency, 
aviation safety records provide examples of this 
phenomenon. There are limitations to studying 
cognitive tunneling through post hoc analysis of 
accidents: it is subject to 20/20 hindsight and 
provides limited basis for generalization and 
prediction (Wickens et al., 1993).  However analysis 
through experimental research has its disadvantages 
as well: it is difficult to achieve the level of stress that 
operators would face in an emergency.  That is why it 
may be useful to explore this phenomenon through 
both approaches.  In the following sections, the 
effects that stress has been found to have on 
operator/pilot performance will be examined, and 
several flights resulting in aircraft accidents will be 
reconstructed to explore the effect that stress had on 
the respective flight crews.  The goal of this paper is 
to fill in some of the gaps left open by research with 
the archival analysis of previous accidents. 
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Cognitive Tunneling and its Cohorts 
 
Cognitive tunneling has been recognized for years as 
a threat to operators who are faced with difficult 
decisions in the midst of an emergency.  It is one of 
the many theories that surround decision making 
under stress. It does not act alone, however.  
Cognitive tunneling, sometimes referred to as 
attention narrowing, works in conjunction with 
several other phenomena that may collectively 
severely affect an operator’s decision-making.  The 
effects of these phenomena are cumulative, and as 
each occurs, the detrimental effect of the previous is 
often increased.  Consequently, the operator is 
typically left with a decreasing amount of relevant 
information with which to work, more puzzling 
phenomena, and an increasing load on her/his 
cognitive processes.  Wickens et al. (1993) present a 
model which provides an effective illustration of the 
stages of the decision-making process and the effects 
that stress has on each.  This is the paradigm through 
which the phenomenon will be examined.    
 
Cue Perception 
 
The first stage, cue perception, is the first phase 
affected by stress.  In most operational environments, 
there are numerous cues that must be considered 
when performing the required tasks.  When operators 
are faced with a stressful situation, there is a 
tendency for the reduction in number of cues that are 
sampled and therefore perceived (Wickens & Flach, 
1988).  This selective allocation is referred to as 
selective attention, and while it is beneficial from a 
time/resource management point of view, operators 
sometimes allocate their attention poorly.  There are 
many factors that can influence the distribution of 
attention, including reliability of the cue, saliency of 
cue, past experience with the cue, operator’s pre-
existing expectations and potential outcomes 
associated (Wickens & Hollands, 2000).  Hence, 
pilots will pay for instance most attention to blinking 
lights or sounding alarms or to gauges confirming 
their initial interpretation of a problem.  However, 
there are contradictory stances on the impact that 
stress has on selective attention.  It has been 
theorized that stress actually improves selective 
attention.  Chajut & Algom (2003), along with 
several others, have found that by imposing stress on 
an operator, she/he is better able to focus on the 
target task and rule out irrelevant cues.  This is not 
entirely contradictory to the theory being presented 
herein.  Stress decreases attention resources, and, 
therefore, greater efficiency is achieved by not 
sampling irrelevant cues and focusing on those 
deemed relevant to the problem.  However, some of 
the cues deemed irrelevant are sometimes relevant, 
and the “efficiency” achieved comes at the price of 
embracing an incorrect interpretation of the unfolding 
scenario.  
 
Working Memory 
 
In the next phase of the model, the hypotheses stored 
in long-term memory are accessed and those assumed 
to be relevant are placed in working memory for 
evaluation.   Additional narrowing can occur at this 
phase.  While several hypotheses are stored in long 
term memory, only those associated with the 
preexisting expectations and the presumed problem 
will be retrieved, omitting several possible 
alternatives.  Operators will then likely fixate on 
these hypotheses.  Also, a function of working 
memory is the evaluation of action outcomes which 
are also retrieved from long-term memory.  Increased 
stress places greater demands on this already 
“fragile” working memory, which degrades decision 
making (Wickens, et al., 1993).  Hence, when pilots 
are faced with emergency situations, instead of 
evaluating all hypotheses learned in training and 
through experience, and thoroughly evaluating each, 
pilots evaluate the hypothesis they believe to be 
relevant with limited consideration of action 
outcomes.  
 
The Cohorts 
 
There are many issues that work hand in hand with 
cognitive tunneling to add to the effects of stress.  
One of these partners is confirmation bias, which 
occurs when an operator forms a premature 
hypothesis and seeks out cues and information to 
support solely this hypothesis (Wickens & Hollands, 
2000).  Many times operators believe they know what 
is causing the problem before they have even 
considered all the options, and instead of collecting 
information to test all of the hypotheses, they collect 
only information pertaining to the presumed cause.  
The operator is then left with a small set of 
information with which to work. When this 
information does not add up and confirmation of the 
hypothesis is not possible, further potential 
confirming cues are usually sought, while 
disconfirming information is usually not considered - 
the operator tends to perseverate.  Belief 
perseverance, another collaborator, takes place when 
a person continues with a familiar plan of action even 
though it is fruitless (Ross & Lepper, 1980).   
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Expert vs. Novice 
 
There has been extensive research in the area of 
cognitive tunneling regarding expert/novice 
differences.  Deitch (2002) found that one of the most 
obvious differences in this area was cognitive 
mapping, where experts had more sophisticated 
cognitive maps and could relate their maps to more 
specific scenarios than novices.  Other studies have 
found that there is a difference between experts and 
novices for instrument fixation, a task thought to be 
linked closely to cognitive processes (Harris, Tole, 
Stephens, & Ephrath, 1982).  Additionally, in some 
tasks, experts even utilized different brain regions 
than novices (Peres et al., 2000).  However, Guilkey 
(1997) determined that when pilots are faced with 
especially cognitively exhausting problems, flight 
time (experts vs. novices) is not a good predictor of 
performance.  Results from this study indicated that 
no matter the strategy used, experts’ performance 
was equal to novice performance.  From these 
differing results, one can see that there are still many 
areas in cognition with respect to expert/novice 
differences to be researched; however, the evidence 
points to the problem of cognitive tunneling as one 
which faces both novice and expert pilots alike. 
 
In the following section, the above theories are 
expounded upon through exploration of their 
presence in several aircraft accidents.  By illustrating 
the existence of these phenomena in reality, not just 
in a simulator setting, compelling support is provided 
for these theories. 
 
Aircraft Accidents 
 
In this section, we examine five accidents in which 
the phenomenon of cognitive tunneling most likely 
played a significant role. 
 
• American Airlines 587, Belle Harbor, NY, 
November 12th 2001 – As the flight was 
cleared for takeoff, the first officer - the flying 
pilot - asked the captain whether he thought 
sufficient distance had been allowed from the 
preceding plane, a large Japan Airlines 
aircraft, in order to avoid wake turbulence. 
The captain stated “aah…yeah...we’ll be 
alright once we get rolling; he’s supposed to 
be five miles by the time we’re airborne, that’s 
the idea”. Shortly after takeoff the plane 
encountered wake turbulence, to which the 
first officer responded with strong aileron 
inputs. Immediately after the encounter the 
captain stated: “Little wake turbulence, huh?”, 
to which the first officer replied “Yeah”. After 
a few more seconds, a second wave of wake 
turbulence was encountered, to which the first 
officer reacted with strong rudder and aileron 
inputs. His aggressive action on the flight 
controls caused the plane to experience 
significant lateral oscillation, which the first 
officer erroneously attributed to wake 
turbulence.  As a result, he continued his 
action on the flight controls, causing the plane 
to experience increasing side loads and 
resulting in the loss of the tail and the engines.. 
Throughout the accident flight, the first officer 
seemed to be convinced that wake turbulence 
would be encountered, and that some type of 
action may be needed.  Records indicated that 
the first officer’s preoccupation with wake 
turbulence was not limited to the accident 
flight, as he had showed strong reactions to 
wake turbulence in earlier occasions.  
 
• United Airlines 173, Portland, OR, December 
28th 1978 – As the aircraft approached the 
arrival airport, a problem arose with the 
landing gear extension. As the gear was 
lowered, the crew heard a loud “thump, 
thump,” and the airplane yawed to the right.  
The only gear lights that came on were those 
indicating the nose gear was down and locked.  
The flight crew elected to assess the problem 
while in a holding pattern. However, the fuel 
level was not adequately monitored, and fuel 
starvation occurred, which caused the plane to 
crash before reaching the airport. About one 
hour elapsed between the time the problem 
with the gear emerged and the time of the 
crash.  The flight engineer was monitoring the 
state of the fuel throughout the last segment of 
the flight and voiced concern to the captain.  
The flight engineer even stated the amount of 
fuel, which, considering the fuel burn rate, 
gives a clear estimate on the amount of time 
until the fuel would be depleted.  However, the 
captain continued on a path that would keep 
them in the air longer than the fuel supply 
allowed. The NTSB determined that the 
probable cause  of the accident was the 
failure of the captain to properly monitor the 
aircraft’s fuel state and to properly respond to 
the low fuel state and the crewmember’s 
advisories regarding fuel state (1979). This 
resulted in fuel exhaustion to all engines.  The 
inattention resulted from preoccupation with a 
landing gear malfunction and preparations for 
a possible landing  emergency (NTSB, 1979). 
The only cues being considered were those 
associated with the landing gear, despite the 
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dire fuel situation.  The captain was unable to 
successfully process the information regarding 
the fuel state because his attention resources 
were exhausted dealing with the landing gear 
problem. 
 
• KLM 4508, Tenerife, March 27th 1977 – 
Numerous flights were diverted to Tenerife 
after the Las Palmas Airport closed because of 
a terrorist attack. The sudden increase in traffic 
caused congestion at Tenerife so that a KLM 
Boeing 747 was forced to wait two hours, 
while another plane, which blocked the 
taxiway, boarded passengers and refueled. The 
KLM flight was eventually allowed to move, 
but takeoff was initiated before a clearance 
had been issued. The plane struck another 
Boeing 747 that was taxing on the runway, 
resulting in the worst accident ever in the 
airline industry. During the takeoff roll, the 
KLM flight crew warned the captain that they 
might not have been cleared for takeoff and 
that another plane might have been taxing on 
the runway. However, the captain seemed to 
be strongly convinced that they had been 
cleared for takeoff and discarded the flight 
crew’s comments.  
 
• Northwest Airlines 6231, Thiells, NY, 
December 1st, 1974 – As the aircraft was 
climbing in icing conditions, the pitot tube 
became clogged by ice, so that the airspeed 
indicator started working as an altimeter, 
indicating increasing airspeed as the plane 
climbed. The flight crew failed to recognize 
the problem and instead believed, despite the 
constant power setting and the climb attitude, 
that the airspeed was in fact increasing. They 
believed that this increase was due to the low 
weight of the aircraft.  Their erroneous 
interpretation lasted throughout the flight, until 
the plane buffeted, stalled, and entered a rapid 
descent. The flight crew apparently believed 
that the buffeting was a high speed 
phenomenon – Mach buffeting – rather than a 
stall buffeting and neglected the possibility of 
a stall despite the indication from the shaker 
stick. The flight crew relied exclusively on the 
air speed indicators and their related warning 
systems, ignoring other pertinent cues pointing 
to a different problem than the one originally 
assessed.   
 
• Eastern Airlines 401, Everglades, FL, 
December 29th, 1972 – As Eastern 401 
approached Miami International Airport and 
lowered the landing gear, the light that  
indicated that the nose landing gear has 
lowered and locked failed to illuminate.  The 
crew chose to depart the airport airspace to the 
west to assess the problem.  The auto- pilot 
was engaged, and they proceeded to evaluate 
the indicator light and the gear status.  As the 
flight continued, the autopilot became 
disengaged and a slight descent initiated. 
Prolonged focus on the landing gear problem 
prevented the flight crew from monitoring 
altitude and the plane proceeded to descend, 
eventually impacting the ground.  The NTSB 
found that the three flight crewmembers were 
preoccupied in an attempt to ascertain the 
position of the nose landing gear and therefore 
neglected monitoring the flight instruments 
(1973).  Much like the crew involved in the 
accident in Portland in 1978, this crew was 
focused on the problem with the landing gear 
and did not sample other cues relating to the 
state of the aircraft.  The flight crew did not 
even hear the altitude alert which sounded as 
the aircraft descended through 1, 750 feet 
m.s.1., an indication that their resources were 
entirely devoted to the landing gear.    
 
Conclusions and Research Indications  
 
As illustrated in the accidents presented above, 
cognitive tunneling likely played a role in several 
aircraft crashes.  In all of the accidents discussed 
above, the pilot did not adequately perceive or 
evaluate all pertinent information necessary to 
successfully complete the flight because of filtering 
based on preexisting expectations, initial 
interpretations, or preoccupation with one aspect of 
the flight.  The dilemma is evident; however, the 
solution is not so lucid.  Prince et al. (1997) suggest 
three remedies that can be applied to overcoming the 
effects of stress in the cockpit: 1) redesign of 
task/environment, 2) selection of crew based on 
ability to withstand stressors, and 3) training, the 
most reasonable intervention.  Prince et al.. suggest 
specific training techniques that appear promising 
including: integrating specific behavioral techniques 
designed to assist in dealing with stress, and 
providing crews the opportunity to practice newly 
acquired skills under condition of graded exposure to 
stressors (1997).  Glyn (1997) suggested developing 
a comprehensive aircrew decision making seminar to 
include awareness training and incorporate pertinent 
research.  In stead of presenting a specific formula 
for optimal decision making, a range of different 
decision types is presented along with the different 
processes used in making a good decision (Glyn, 
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1997).  There are currently pilot training programs 
that do incorporate stress management and decision 
making training into their Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) training (Prince et al., 1997).  
However, alterations to these programs to include 
awareness training of the phenomena that can occur 
as a result of stress, such as cognitive tunneling, may 
prove beneficial.  By exposing pilots to the theories 
and the research into the effects of stress on 
performance, and by illustrating these effects through 
previous accidents and occurrence in actual simulator 
training, pilots’ susceptibility to it may decrease.  
Further research on pilot training with respect to 
stress and its effects is needed to better understand 
how to cope with this issue. 
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